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1. INTRODUCTION
The process of European integration started more than half a century ago. In this 
period, the economic environment and geographic outlook of integration have 
changed significantly. In accordance with these changes, the policies needed to 
achieve optimum economic impacts were also modified. As European integra-
tion was widening, the debate about the differences in the level of development 
of member states has been growing. European convergence policy began in 1986 
by including the objective of “economic and social cohesion” into the Single 
European Act. It was believed that certain areas within the Community might not 
be able to develop at the same pace as some other areas within the Single Market. 
The European Union defines “economic and social cohesion” as an expression of 
solidarity between the Member States (MS) and regions of the European Union, 
which means balanced and sustainable development, reducing structural dispari-
ties between regions and countries, and promoting equal opportunities for all in-
dividuals (Welcome Europe 2015). The discussion about the economic success 
of these policies focused on economic cohesion is still very vivid (Kamps et al. 
2009; Hagen – Mohl 2009; Dăianu 2012), especially after the Eastern enlarge-
ment in 2004 (Dobre 2010; Panagiotou 2013). Furthermore, because of the fact 
that the conclusions about these policies from the literature are still ambiguous 
(Sala-i-Martin 1996; Boldrin – Canova 2001; Martin 2005; Bouvet 2010), the 
perspective for the further development of new member states (NMS) is vague. 
Winiecki (2012) goes even further and labels the debate about euro zone’s prob-
lems as “an irritating superficiality”. This study attempts to shed more light on 
this issue, with regard to the greatest enlargement in the history of EU in 2004 
and the great recession of 2008. Here, superficiality of the analysis is avoided 
by observing the differences and similarities in the level of development among 
MS in chosen reference years and by taking into account a set of variables that 
indirectly or directly define economic development in its broader sense. Did the 
cohesion policy succeed in its stated purpose despite of the crisis?
As stated in the definition of social and economic cohesion, well-being and the 
structure of national economies should become more akin inside the integration 
and therefore more resistant to exogenous shocks such as the global economic 
crisis, which suggests that the standard economic growth and development, and 
living standard indicators should be included in the analysis. Furthermore, ra-
tionale suggests that integration, along with cohesion policy, would increase 
the economic prosperity of nations by reducing structural problems such as un-
employment, in particular long-term unemployment, and improve the situation 
of old workers, youth, women, and other vulnerable population groups whose 
situation is expected to further deteriorate in times of crisis. If older people have 
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less formal qualifications and are more vulnerable to technological change in 
favour of skills (Disney – Hawkes 2003), even though older people are gener-
ally better protected (Leschke – Watt 2010), it is expected that the employment 
of older workers would decrease more in relatively less developed countries 
because of the structural defects inherent to these economies compared to more 
developed EU members. Vice versa intuition suggests young people are more 
educated and technologically literate, and could therefore be the driving force 
of future development, hence the demographic structure of the society should be 
considered as well. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief overview 
of the selected EU enlargement literature that is closely related to the subject of 
this study. Section 3 describes the developed model, the data sources, and the 
methodology applied to yield the results of multivariate analysis presented in 
Section 4. Findings are discussed in terms of ongoing scholarly debate about the 
success of European integration, and conclusions are offered in the last section.
2. EASTERN ENLARGEMENT DEBATE
The success of the Eastern enlargement has been studied extensively (Agnew 
2001; Reinert – Kattel 2007; Breuss 2009; Hlavac 2010). We are concerned only 
with the economic effects of the integration and we differentiate these studies 
from other research dealing mostly with institutional convergence (see, e.g., 
López-Tamayo et al. 2014).
Ottaviano et al. (2007) modelled the effect of the impact of accession of coun-
tries to the European Monetary Union and the 2004 enlargement on competitive-
ness. They conclude that the impact is two-fold: improved accessibility of NMS, 
but significantly increased relative importance of non-productive enterprises from 
Eastern Europe. Breuss (2009) argues that the expansion in 2004 and 2007 was 
a result of political motives, while previous expansions were means to achieve 
economic objectives – the expansion of the Single Market and monetary union 
with a single currency. Nevertheless, Breuss (2009) believes that the expectations 
of NMS of the European integration had been completely fulfilled: all countries 
have grown faster than before integration. The labour markets improved their 
performances in most countries, fiscal consolidation was successful everywhere 
except Hungary, and the trade between new and old member states expanded. 
Hlavac (2010) believes that the enlargement in 2004 and 2007 had a positive 
impact on NMS since they had to undertake the political, economic, and social 
reforms, which consolidated their democracies and enhanced their market econo-
mies. Vachudova (2013) gives an even more decisive judgment on the success of 
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the enlargement, emphasising the benefits for both old and new MS and argues 
that the enlargement was the most successful exampley of democracy promot-
ing in history. However, there is no consensus regarding the positive or negative 
impact of enlargement. Reinert – Kattel (2007) contend that the expansion of 
the EU brought a qualitative shift from symmetrical to asymmetrical integration; 
a process that culminated with the 2004 enlargement. Furthermore, the authors 
argue that this shift represents a threat to Europe’s prosperity for both the core 
and periphery. Meardi (2012) also claims that workers in new member states no 
longer have access to the “social Europe”, but are the victims of stagnation and 
even deterioration of social and working conditions, while their capacity for col-
lective action is politically marginalised and de facto non-existent. 
In this paper, we build on the classification of EU countries into clusters ac-
cording to structural economic indicators using factor and cluster analysis (Kur-
noga- Zivadinovic et al. 2009). Their preliminary classification was based on 
only three structural economic indicators. This paper takes multivariate analysis 
further by using different points in time and a larger set of variables to monitor 
the changes that have occurred during the analysed period. This approach ena-
bles us to inspect the dynamics of the changes in similarities and discrepancies 
between European MS during the analysed period. This form of analysis is lack-
ing in the existing debate about the achievements of the European integration and 
may be seen as a contribution to the extant literature.
3. METHODOLOGY AND MODEL
The analysis is conducted for three years: 2002, 2007, and 2012, each one de-
noting one specific point in time for European integration. Year 2002 is chosen 
as a reference point before the EU largest enlargement that occurred in 2004. 
Year 2007 is chosen to observe the potential changes in the clustering due to the 
enlargement, but before the crisis struck. The last year for which all data were 
available is 2012, and it is interesting to examine the changes in clustering as a 
result of the crisis. Analysis is conducted for 28 EU member states, as of 2013. 
It is worth noting that the analysis is conducted for all countries in the EU-28 
sample for every year observed. Thus, for example, Croatia as the most recent EU 
member state as of July 1, 2013, is included in the analysis for the whole period. 
It enables us to investigate to which cluster a new member state would belong, 
regardless of its EU membership at that time. This is useful for examining the 
differences in clustering before and after the EU accession, i.e. it determines the 
impact of EU accession on cluster membership.
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Data are obtained from the World Bank (2013) and the European Commission 
(2014). The data set totalling 19 economic variables was tested for multicollinear-
ity through Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), since multicollinearity could impact 
the results of cluster analysis significantly. After examining multicollinearity, 
9 variables were chosen: ltun (long-term unemployment in % of active popula-
tion), eldem (employment rate of older workers), lifeex (life expectancy at birth), 
gdp (real GDP per capita), urbpop (urban population in % of total), imex (export-
import coverage ratio), dep (age dependency ratio, old % of working-age popula-
tion), prem (employment in agriculture in % of total employment), and femact 
(female activity rate for females aged 15–64). These variables are included in the 
model because they stand as good proxies for economic prosperity and countries 
are clustered according to these indicators of economic development.
The long-term unemployment indicator is used because by entering the single 
European market, the mobility of the workforce increases and the labour market 
is expected to resolve imbalances more easily, and therefore long-term unem-
ployment is expected to fall (Kahanec et al. 2010). Furthermore, long-term un-
employment is more appropriate than the basic rate of unemployment since the 
variation in short-term unemployment is substantially smaller than in long-term 
unemployment (Nickell 1997), i.e. it is easier to notice the differences between 
countries through time for long-term unemployment. The employment rate of 
older workers is chosen because it is a good proxy variable for the impact of the 
crisis. It is expected that the less affected countries would have a near-constant 
rate of employment of older workers, while this rate would decline in more af-
fected countries (Disney – Hawkes 2003; Leschke – Watt 2010). Life expectancy 
at birth is a proxy variable for general well-being (e.g. Balezentis et al. 2011), as 
is GDP per capita and the proportion of the urban population (O’Sullivan 2011). 
The export–import coverage ratio approximates country competitiveness. The age 
dependency ratio serves as an indicator of development potential: the lower the 
age dependency, the higher the development potential and vice versa. Employ-
ment in agriculture is also good approximation of the relative development since 
developed countries have smaller agricultural sector relative to their GDP. The 
female activity rate denotes the equality of the sexes, which is also connected to 
development because developed countries generally have greater gender equality 
than developing countries. Based on this set of variables, we proceed with the 
multivariate analysis of EU member states.
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4. RESULTS OF MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
The set of chosen variables in the model has been used to conduct a hierarchical 
cluster analysis, followed by the K-means cluster analysis and discriminant anal-
ysis. Ward’s method with squared Euclidian distances is used for the hierarchical 
cluster analysis. Hierarchical analysis offers a possible number of clusters. Based 
on the results of hierarchical analysis, three clusters are chosen for conducting 
the K-means cluster analysis. A summary of the K-means cluster analysis for all 
years can be found in the Appendix for the convenience of the reader. Discrimi-
nant analysis is then conducted to check the results of the cluster analysis. The 
three-step multivariate analysis is performed for three periods: before the great 
enlargement (2002), after the enlargement and before the crisis (2007), and after 
the crisis (2012). 
4.1. EU integration clusters before the enlargement 
In 2002, the EU consisted of 15 states. Therefore it is interesting to observe the 
grouping of the countries before the 12 NMS entered the integration. First, a clus-
ter analysis on standardised values is conducted. 
Based on the dendrogram of Ward’s method of hierarchical cluster analysis 
with squared Euclidian distances, the solution with three clusters is chosen. The 
first cluster consists of 13 countries (Belgium, Spain, Italy, Germany, France, 
Austria, Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Ireland, Hungary, Slovenia, and 
Malta), the second of 5 countries (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, UK, and 
Sweden), and a third of 10 countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Slovakia, Esto-
nia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Greece, and Portugal). Obviously, clusters are 
not clearly separated with regard to the EU membership. The third cluster is made 
up of NMS (and Croatia, which was not a member during the whole analysed 
period), except for the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Slovenia, Malta, and Hungary, 
and with the addition of Greece and Portugal from among the old MS. Gener-
ally, countries are grouped in accordance with their historical, political, social, 
geographic, and economic conditions. However, it is interesting that Slovenia is 
grouped in a relatively more developed cluster compared to Croatia, even though 
they have very similar historical and geographical properties. This might be due 
to the fact that in 2002, Croatia was still in a post-war recovery period.
To confirm the results of the hierarchical cluster analysis, the K-means method 
of unhierarchical cluster analysis for three clusters is conducted. The second clus-
ter consists of third-cluster countries from Ward’s method, with the addition of 
Hungary and Slovenia. Therefore, it could be said that the K-means solution is 
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somewhat more intuitive because the second cluster now consists of all new MS, 
with the addition of Greece and Portugal. This cluster is denoted as the under-
developed cluster. The Czech Republic, Cyprus, Malta, and Ireland moved from 
the first to the third cluster, which is depicted as a semi-developed cluster, while 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, and the UK all moved to the first 
cluster. Now, there are no NMS in the first cluster, it consists of only the most 
developed countries. The graph representing the means of the three clusters is 
shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1.1 Means of the three clusters in 2002 (K-means)
It is apparent from Figure 1 that the first, most developed cluster has low long-
term unemployment and primary sector employment, and high life expectancy at 
birth, real GDP p.c., share of urban population, export–import coverage ratio, and 
female activity rate. Furthermore, a separated cluster with the Czech Republic, 
Malta, Ireland, and Cyprus is obviously a semi-developed cluster – a mixture of 
new and old MS. This cluster differs predominantly in demographic variables 
(dep and femact) and in female activity it fares worse than the other two clusters. 
The only variable in which there is relative similarity between the three clusters 
is elderly employment. 
Finally, discriminant analysis is conducted for the K-means solution. Variables 
eldem, lifeex, urbpop, dep, and femact contribute the most to cluster separation 
(p-value < 0.1). This result fits in with the results of the cluster analysis because 
Figure 1 suggests that with separation of the Czech Republic, Malta, Cyprus, and 
Ireland, significant differences in demographic variables occur. Additionally, the 
1  All figures are plotted using ggplot2 package in R.
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classification matrix obtained by discriminant analysis showed that all countries 
are correctly divided into clusters.
For 2002, the cluster analysis results show significant differences. The solution 
with three clusters clearly separates old MS from those which joined the EU in 
2004 and in 2007, which is in line with the asymmetrical integration hypothesis 
of Reinert – Kattel (2007). Obviously, before the eastern enlargement, current 
EU member states differed significantly in their levels of development. In order 
to observe the potential changes in country grouping due to the enlargement, the 
next analysed year is 2007.
4.2. EU integration clusters after enlargement and before the crisis
Taking into account the goals of cohesion policy, one should expect a reduction in 
the gap between regions and countries inside the EU. If there is indeed a conver-
gence among new and old MS, then (i) more countries would join the relatively 
more developed cluster, or (ii) the gap between the clusters containing the same 
countries would decrease.
Again, cluster analysis on standardised values is conducted with Ward’s meth-
od with squared Euclidian distances. The composition of clusters is identical to 
the hierarchical cluster analysis in 2002. K-means method of unhierarchical clus-
ter analysis is conducted for three clusters. K-means results in 2007 show some 
differences in comparison to 2002. The first cluster still consists of the most de-
veloped countries, with the addition of the Czech Republic, Ireland, Cyprus, and 
Malta (which were separated into their own cluster in 2002) and this cluster is 
now the developed one. The second cluster contains new MS, Greece, Portugal, 
and Croatia, and is denoted as underdeveloped cluster 1. Unlike in 2002, the 
third cluster now consists of Bulgaria and the Baltic countries (Estonia, Lithua-
nia, and Latvia) and it is marked as underdeveloped cluster 2. It seems that this 
separated cluster with only four countries is now somewhat underdeveloped in 
comparison with the separated cluster in 2002, hence the change in the name of 
the separated cluster. Because it is hard to unambiguously determine which of the 
two latter clusters is more/less developed, they are both labelled as underdevel-
oped clusters. According to the distances from the cluster centre, the separated 
cluster (underdeveloped cluster 2) is the most homogeneous (distances from 0.35 
to 0.53). Furthermore, Ireland, Cyprus, and Malta have relatively high distances 
from the cluster centre (0.89, 0.91 and 1.37, respectively), which does not come 
as a surprise in the light of the 2002 cluster analysis results when they had formed 
a separate cluster. The reason behind this probably lies with different variables 
being the most significant discriminators between country groups. Therefore, one 
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should not read too much into the fact that they are now labelled as developed in 
the European context, especially for Cyprus and Malta. However, the Czech Re-
public is rather close to the cluster centre of the developed cluster (0.64), which 
illustrates the fact that the Czech Republic might have used the advantages of EU 
membership and the Single Market to close the gap from the core. It should in all 
fairness be added that the Czech Republic put in significant efforts in the period 
before the accession to substantially improve the business climate by liberalising 
the services sector and opening the economy (Arnold et al. 2011), and therefore 
its success should not be attributed solely to EU membership. The same applies 
for other countries as well. Their policies and reforms adopted in the course of the 
accession had synergic effects on their respective development, and not the EU 
membership per se. Therefore, we observe how the countries capitalised the op-
portunities provided by EU membership and enlargement, and not how EU mem-
bership in itself changed their level of development in comparison with other MS. 
For an additional analysis of the development disparities, it is instructive to look 
at Figure 2 with the means of the three clusters in 2007.
Figure 2. Means of the three clusters in 2007 (K-means)
The differences in comparison to 2002 are not immediately clear. However, 
if the differences between means are observed more carefully, moderate conver-
gence in most variables becomes visible. Whereas it was in the period of only five 
years, this result is in line with cohesion policy goals. Of course, it is important 
to emphasise that regional convergence (which is also one of cohesion policy 
goals) is not covered here, but only convergence between countries. This result 
can be attributed to several facts: (i) economic growth and general optimism after 
the creation of the EMU in 2000; (ii) significantly higher marginal product of 
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capital in the periphery in comparison to Western Europe (Lipshitz et al. 2006), 
which attracts foreign investments; (iii) credit boom and accumulating current 
account imbalances, which fuelled consumption (Schmitz – von Hagen 2011; 
Lane – McQuade 2014), while at the same time raising the vulnerability of these 
countries to the external shocks, which will be addressed in the next section; 
and (iv) shifting of fiscal policy from countercyclical more towards procyclical 
(Bénétrix – Lane 2013), which had an impact on enhancing the magnitude of 
growth rates, but likewise of potential downfall. Therefore, the results confirm 
the highlighted fact from Lipshitz et al. (2006) that Europe had slow real conver-
gence in the period 2002–2007. It is important to note that point (ii) refers to the 
average impact of FDI from more to less developed EU member states. Weinhold 
– Nair-Reichert (2001) emphasise that there is considerable heterogeneity across 
countries regarding the impact of FDI on economic growth, while Alfaro et al. 
(2007) highlight the importance of institutional quality and policy as determi-
nants of capital inflows. Therefore, large FDI inflows to CEE countries in this 
period (Lane – Milesi-Ferretti 2007) should not be observed as the main anteced-
ent of observed convergence, but rather as an indication of institutional advance-
ments and policies implemented which resulted in some countries being better 
off, while the average level of development in NMS also increased. Furthermore, 
Bogumil (2014) provides evidence for the positive impact of FDI on growth, but 
argues that while FDI into construction and real estate had a positive impact on 
growth, it fuelled asset price bubbles and was not sustainable. On the other hand, 
in some countries such as Poland, FDI were directed towards the tradable sector 
and supported strong export growth without fuelling credit and substantial asset 
price booms, which proved to be a better long-term strategy.  
It is clear from Figure 2 that the developed cluster is again distinguished as be-
ing the most advanced with the lowest long-term unemployment and employment 
in agriculture, and the highest GDP per capita, life expectancy at birth, percentage 
of the urban population, and export–import coverage ratio. Furthermore, under-
developed cluster 2 is now somewhat less developed than semi-developed cluster 
in 2002, which is to be expected since countries which form the cluster in 2007 
are removed from the underdeveloped countries cluster, unlike in 2002, when 
they were separated from the cluster of developed countries. This third cluster 
has the lowest life expectancy, GDP per capita, export-import coverage ratio, 
highest age dependency ratio, and female activity rate. The second cluster stands 
out in the highest long-term unemployment, the lowest elderly employment, and 
percentage of urban population. The main difference in comparison to 2002 is 
that now there are two less developed clusters, whereas in 2002 there were two 
more developed and one underdeveloped cluster. Clustering of Bulgaria with the 
Baltic countries might be surprising at first, especially considering the fact that 
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the GDP per capita of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia was EUR 9900, 7700 and 
7200, respectively, while Bulgarian GDP per capita was EUR 3400. However, the 
reason behind this grouping lies largely with demographic similarities between 
the countries. Life expectancy and age dependency are two variables which are 
practically non-distinguishable among the four countries, while the percentage of 
urban population and female activity rates were also fairly similar between the 
four countries in comparison with other countries in the sample. 
The results of the discriminant analysis for the K-means suggest that variables 
lifeex, urbpop, and imex are the best discriminators, unlike in 2002. This is prob-
ably the reason behind the different cluster separation when compared to 2002 
when Ireland, Malta, Cyprus, and the Czech Republic were in the third cluster. 
The result is in line with economic intuition, as high life expectancy and high 
share of urban population are characteristics of the most developed economies. 
Likewise, export–import coverage ratio is a distinctive variable between the core 
and the periphery since generally there is an agglomeration of economic activity 
and industrial production in the core (Krugman 1991), and of labour-intensive 
activities on the periphery (Brülhart 1998). Finally, the classification matrix re-
vealed that all countries are correctly distributed into clusters.
4.3. EU integration after the crisis
The analysis of the changes in 2012 is probably the most interesting because 
it tries to capture the changes caused by the largest economic crisis after the 
Great Depression in the 1930s. Ward’s method with squared Euclidian distances 
is again conducted on standardised values.
The results for Ward’s method are no longer identical to 2002 and 2007. The 
first cluster is composed of Belgium, France, Austria, Finland, the UK, Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden. The second cluster contains Ireland 
and Luxembourg and the third cluster is composed of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus, 
Malta, Romania, Greece, Croatia, Spain, Portugal, and Italy. For the first time, 
one cluster is composed of only two countries. There are very modest distances 
between Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, which is in line with the third 
cluster obtained with the K-means method in 2007. 
Again, the K-means method of the unhierarchical cluster analysis is conducted 
for three clusters. The first cluster now contains Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, and Austria and it 
is denoted as a semi-developed cluster; the second Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, 
Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and 
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Slovakia and it is denoted as an underdeveloped cluster; and the third, developed 
cluster, is made up of Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, and 
the UK. This result is much more intuitive because the third cluster is composed 
of the most developed EU countries, and it is a cluster which was separated in 
the hierarchical analysis in 2002 and 2007 with the addition of Germany. Based 
on cluster centre distances (from 0.27 to 0.53), it can be concluded that this clus-
ter is fairly homogeneous. It is important to stress that differing labels between 
clusters serve as orientation in the EU context and are relative. For example, this 
analysis does not categorise France, Italy, or Austria as semi-developed countries. 
It rather suggests that from the analysis conducted on this set of variables, these 
countries fare somewhat worse in comparison with countries from the developed 
cluster. Furthermore, if a country was classified as developed in 2007 (for ex-
ample France) and semi-developed in 2012, it does not mean that this country 
was developing backwards. Instead, this can be interpreted as coping moderately 
worse than the countries in developed cluster in this five-year period. Obviously, 
the crisis accentuated some inherent structural problems with some economies. 
This is probably the reason behind some old MS that were labelled as developed 
in 2007 and then labelled as semi- or underdeveloped in 2012 (such as Italy, 
France, Spain, and Belgium). For example, in 2007, few were aware of the real 
estate price bubble. Bond yields on almost all EU member states were roughly 
on the same level (Lane 2012). Suddenly, the crisis struck and the weaknesses 
of some economies became apparent. Once the bubbles burst and bond yields 
diverged, it became obvious that development achievements from 2007 of some 
countries were built on rotten foundations. 
The disparities between clusters are apparent from the graph of means shown 
in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Means of the three clusters in 2012 (K-means)
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The developed cluster has by far the lowest long-term unemployment, the larg-
est elderly employment, and female activity rates as well as the largest GDP per 
capita and percentage of urban population. The second cluster is by far the least 
developed; it contains the undeveloped European periphery. Obviously, the crisis 
struck the periphery more heavily. The K-means results in 2012 suggest discon-
tinuance of observed convergence in the earlier period.
Discrimant analysis is conducted to check the results of K-means method. Var-
iable lifeex remains the best discriminator, but the second best discriminator is 
variable eldem. It is surprising that GDP per capita was never a particularly strong 
discriminator. That is probably a result of larger differences in other determinants 
of development than in the size of the economy per se. The classification matrix 
shows that all countries are correctly grouped into clusters.
These significant changes that occurred in 2012 require further explanation. 
Obviously, the crisis played an important role, but neither should the role of mac-
roeconomic management prior to and after the crisis be underestimated. Long 
before the creation of EMU, there were warnings about the potential impact of 
asymmetric shocks and the capacity of member countries to withstand them suc-
cessfully (Wyplosz1997). Obviously, there were significant differences in mac-
roeconomic management between different countries, mainly in fiscal policy 
measures. These differences are apparent in the country clustering of 2012. For 
example, when taking into account the loans to private sector from domestic 
banks and current account balances, it is no longer surprising that Germany and 
France are not part of the same cluster. As Lane (2012) emphasises, while Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and France accumulated the private sector debt in 
the period 1998–2007, Germany was deleveraging in the same period. Likewise, 
while France was moving around zero current account balance and other coun-
tries accumulated deficits, Germany accumulated a current account surplus of 
5.1% of GDP in the period 2003–2007 (Lane 2012). Interestingly, all countries in 
the most developed cluster but the United Kingdom have one distinctive charac-
teristic: significant current account surpluses (Schmitz – von Hagen 2011; World 
Bank 2013), which suggests that trade imbalances indeed play an important role 
in the development of EU member states. Therefore, with the benefit of hind-
sight, the conclusion of Schmitz – von Hagen (2011) that “the observed current 
account balances should be regarded as signs of proper functioning of the euro 
area rather than sign of improper macro-economic adjustment” could nowadays 
be regarded as reversed. Furthermore, apart from different policies pursued be-
fore the crisis, the sudden halt in mentioned FDI movements from the previous 
period should also be mentioned. As a result of the crisis, investors’ mistrust and 
scepticism exacerbated the crisis in some countries, which depended heavily on 
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FDI inflows, or, more precisely, in countries that had a higher exposure to foreign 
portfolio investments and foreign loans (Tong – Wei 2011). 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper analysed the effects of (i) the biggest enlargement of the EU in its 
history, and (ii) the impact of the crisis on the grouping of countries according to 
selected variables. The impact of the enlargement was positive: if the slow con-
vergence that Europe experienced in the period from 2002 to 2007 would have 
continued, then European integration would have had a bright perspective. How-
ever, the conducted cluster analysis showed that this was not the case between 
2007–2012. Multivariate analysis showed that the countries grouped differently 
into clusters in different years according to our selected variables. Furthermore, 
the differences had risen between 2007 and 2012, which suggest that dispari-
ties between most developed and less developed MS increased. Moreover, NMS 
never clustered with the core countries, bar in 2007, when only the Czech Re-
public, Cyprus and Malta found their way into developed cluster, mainly due to 
large FDI inflow (Avery et al. 2009) which improved their economic perform-
ances. However, further analysis showed that this “clustering with the big play-
ers” was only short-term, which suggests that less developed EU member states 
need to find different mechanisms to kick-start their economies after the crisis 
as a means to catch up with the European core. Another important point to note 
is that the most developed countries. i.e. Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Finland, Sweden, and the UK, formed the developed cluster in 2012 by them-
selves, which calls attention to their resistance to the crisis relative to their less 
developed peers.
Hence, the two pillars of European integration, the European single market 
mechanism and cohesion policy successfully promoted market conditions for 
convergence before the crisis. However, they did not safeguard this success from 
the instability caused by the global financial crisis. While it would be appealing 
to pinpoint the lack of redistribution or inability of market mechanism to achieve 
the goal of integration in spite of the EU cohesion supports, it is too difficult to as-
sess the contribution of numerous different factors on the observed divergence to 
claim that more redistribution would lead to different outcomes. This is also con-
nected to the different policies adopted before and during the crisis. Although the 
main purpose of our research was to determine the country clusters due to eastern 
enlargement and the great recession, different approaches followed by different 
countries still significantly influence the results. Still, the analysis showed which 
countries used the enlargement to the best of their interest and which countries 
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were successful in building the strong foundation that could endure the crisis 
somewhat painlessly. 
Our results are in line with expectations – the core copes well in spite of the 
crisis, while the periphery (containing principally NMS) finds itself in a difficult 
economic situation. However, caution is needed when interpreting this conclu-
sion. While the recession and the eastern enlargement certainly played an impor-
tant role in determining the cluster membership of the countries, it is important 
to bear in mind that policies adopted by the governments as well as other factors 
such as the competitiveness of the economy and the efficacy of institutions also 
influenced cluster membership. Obviously, it should be acknowledged that the 
core countries overcame the crisis because of their macro-management. Fiscal 
discipline and responsibility enabled them to stay liquid even when the crisis 
struck. They had healthy foundations with current account surpluses and high 
competitiveness, which facilitated their relatively quick recovery after 2009. On 
the other hand, periphery and some old MS showed worrying levels of fiscal 
and political irresponsibility. When this is combined with asset price bubbles, 
it should not be surprising that they fare somewhat worse. Therefore, the real 
question is how the countries used the opportunities presented from 2002–2007 
and how they coped with the challenges in the next period with regard to their 
EU membership. However, the argument that every individual country is exclu-
sively responsible for itself is not overly convincing since it blurs the role of the 
EU and cohesion policy. European integration should create a buffer to external 
shocks at least to some extent; the latest crisis exposed its deficiencies, especially 
in combination with misplaced policies in some MS. This result raises questions 
about the ability of European institutions to ensure responsible behaviour and ef-
fective policies through multi-level governance. Furthermore, in 10 years, even 
the countries which showed admirable improvements on most fronts (such as the 
Czech Republic for example) did not make it to the developed cluster in 2012, 
which is somewhat worrying.
These results affirm the conclusion of Halmai – Vásáry (2011) which they call 
the “convergence crisis”. Core countries fear that the moral hazard would be 
too large if they were to help the periphery, i.e. undeveloped countries would not 
have a genuine incentive to overcome the crisis through their own efforts. Indeed, 
how would Germany, for example, who was deleveraging and focusing on export 
growth before the crisis convince its taxpayers they should help their fellow Eu-
ropeans (in Greece, Spain, Italy, etc.). On the other hand, periphery countries are 
blaming the core for imposing austerity measures and deepening their difficult 
economic condition. This again brings out the debate on the fiscal union (Bordo et 
al. 2013). As Dăianu (2012) emphasises, fiscal rules, surveillance, and peer pres-
sure are not enough for strengthening the cohesion of the EU. Furthermore, Müller 
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et al. (2014) argue that the debates on how to deal with the crisis have powerfully 
revealed that the legitimacy deficit of the EU constitutes a pressing problem for 
the future of European integration. Because of this political turmoil, it is hard to 
foresee a significant economic resurrection in the periphery, which is why the 
success of European integration emphasised by Breuss (2009) and Vachudova 
(2013) is questionable today. One thing to be optimistic about is the lower age 
dependency ratio in less developed EU countries in all observed years. Obviously, 
it represents their strength in comparison with developed countries because their 
pension systems will be less burdened and they have a younger workforce which 
fares better with potential technological change. However, in the future, this could 
also be influenced by different migration policies inside the EU.
Although the conclusion of the politically destabilising effect of the division 
of Europe into a core and a periphery is consistent with recent literature (Samary 
2012; Bellofiore 2013), the presented analysis has some inherent disadvantages: 
(1) The selected variables are not a perfect description of development, but 
mere approximations. Their selection automatically abstracted some other signif-
icant moments such as institutions, the efficiency of the political system, democ-
racy, inequality within countries, etc. It is important to be aware of this limita-
tion since the cluster membership of the countries is indeed indirectly influenced 
by the institutional and political context of the respective country, as mentioned 
above, and it is worth exploring further.
(2) It is implicitly assumed that differences between countries over the years 
are affected only by European integration, which is also connected to the issue 
mentioned above. Actually, this is not a strong assumption since it is likely that 
European integration indirectly impacted economic performance through reforms 
and policies adopted during the accession as well as through capital inflows from 
Western Europe. 
(3) The list of variables used is not exhaustive, and other variables could in-
fluence the country clustering differently. However, the aim of this paper is to 
cluster the member states across different years and observe the discrepancies 
by using the same variables, rather than quantify economic development per se. 
Therefore, the set of indicators used is considered appropriate for the purpose of 
this research. In line with this, expanded models in future research would yield 
more in-depth comprehension about the EU integration and economic develop-
ment nexus.
Despite these limitations, several stylised facts can be drawn from the analysis: 
(i) at the beginning of the 21st century, there was some indication of cohesion in 
EU-28, but it was probably more a result of enthusiasm and general economic up-
turn in this period than a result of quality and coordination of policies at EU level; 
(ii) some countries used the opportunities presented in the first period better than 
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their peers and even grouped with the most developed EU member states; (iii) 
point (i) was highlighted when the crisis struck and revealed and emphasised the 
disparities between the core and the periphery; and (iv) these revealed inequali-
ties in the level of development were the result of the combination of misplaced 
policies before and after the crisis in some MS and some inherent disadvantages 
in the EU-level management, mainly related to the lack of political and fiscal 
union (Fuest – Peichl 2012; Bordo et al. 2013).
As Panagiotou (2013) already noted, the economic situation in which NMS 
found themselves since the beginning of the crisis could also prove significant 
for the enthusiasm of EU membership candidates. If there is no robust evidence 
of cohesion inside the European integration, their incentive to join will be inde-
terminate. Unfortunately, at this moment in time, such evidence does not exist; 
quite contrary, we exhibit some slight clue that in the midst of the crisis the EU 
has wandered off the cohesion path from the beginning of the 21st century.
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APPENDIX: CLUSTER ANALYSIS SUMMARY
2002 2007 2012
Developed cluster Developed cluster Developed cluster
Denmark Denmark Denmark
Germany Germany Germany
Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands
Finland Finland Finland
Sweden Sweden Sweden
UK UK UK
Belgium Belgium
Underdeveloped 
cluster
Spain Spain Bulgaria
France France Estonia
Italy Italy Greece
Luxembourg Luxembourg Croatia
Austria Austria Latvia
Underdeveloped 
cluster Czech Republic Lithuania
Bulgaria Ireland Hungary
Estonia Cyprus Poland
Latvia Malta Portugal
Lithuania
Underdeveloped 
cluster 1 Romania
Greece Greece Slovenia
Croatia Croatia Slovakia
Hungary Hungary
Semi-developed 
cluster
Poland Poland Belgium
Portugal Portugal Spain
Romania Romania France
Slovenia Slovenia Italy
Slovakia Slovakia Luxembourg
Semi-developed 
cluster
Underdeveloped 
cluster 2 Austria
Czech Republic Bulgaria Czech Republic
Ireland Estonia Ireland
Cyprus Latvia Cyprus
Malta Lithuania Malta
